Arboleda v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2005 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-19-2005 
Arboleda v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 
Recommended Citation 
"Arboleda v. Atty Gen USA" (2005). 2005 Decisions. 385. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/385 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of*
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Monique Rubiano Arboleda, a native and citizen of Colombia, seeks review
of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“the BIA”).  The BIA rejected
Arboleda’s claim that the Immigration Judge (“the IJ”) violated her rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The BIA also affirmed, with modification, the
IJ’s decision denying Arboleda’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal, protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and voluntary departure.  Arboleda
3appealed.  We hold that no due process violation occurred, but because the basis for the
modified affirmance is unclear, we remand for clarification. 
I.
Because the Court writes for the parties and the BIA only, we briefly
summarize the facts.  Arboleda claims that she fled from political persecution inflicted by
a non-governmental organization in Colombia.  Arboleda filed a motion to adjourn her
hearing so that she could obtain more evidence, but the IJ denied the motion.  The IJ
found that Arboleda’s testimony was “clearly a fabrication,” and expressed the belief that
Arboleda had come to the United States solely for personal reasons.  AR at 51.  The IJ
further concluded that Arboleda had not shown that the Colombian government was
“unable or unwilling” to protect her from persecution.  
Before the BIA, Arboleda challenged the adverse credibility determination,
alleged that her due process rights were violated by denial of her motion to adjourn, and
alleged that the IJ had committed numerous irregularities during the hearing, such as
calling Arboleda a liar during her testimony, turning the tape recorder on and off, and
speaking directly to Arboleda in Spanish off the record.  The BIA refused to consider
most of Arboleda’s due process allegations because they were neither in the record nor
supported by affidavits.  AR at 3–4.  The BIA held that the few observable instances of
hostility by the IJ did not amount to a due process violation.  Id.  The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s denial of Arboleda’s requests for withholding of removal, asylum, and CAT
4protection, but the BIA commented as follows: “We do not adopt the Immigration
Judge’s repeated suggestions that the respondent’s testimony was necessisarily
fabricated.”  AR at 2.
II.
Aliens facing removal have certain due process rights.  See Sewak v. INS,
900 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)
(deportation proceedings involving aliens must meet “essential standards of fairness”). 
The requirements of due process “depend[] on the circumstances of the particular
situation.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting
Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996)).  “The fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).  
Although we do not take Arboleda’s allegations lightly, the record does not
reflect most of the irregularities that Arboleda claims occurred at the hearing.  Arboleda
failed to place the irregularities in the record by registering an objection, and she did not
even submit an affidavit on appeal to show that such irregularities occurred.  See AR at
3–4; Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 550 (stating that the alien has the burden of proving
irregularity).  Arboleda concedes that the few instances of hostility that are evident do
not, by themselves, amount to a due process violation.  
5Because the BIA did not address the IJ’s denial of Arboleda’s motion to
adjourn, the Court reviews the IJ’s decision directly.  Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434,
439 (3d Cir. 2003).  The denial of a motion to adjourn is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 376–77 (3d Cir. 2003) (denial of motion to
continue is reviewed for abuse of discretion).  The IJ acted within her discretion in
concluding that the evidence Arboleda hoped to obtain might not exist, and that Arboleda
had time to obtain it during the previous continuance.  Further, Arboleda has not shown
that additional testimony would have included more convincing information.  See Wilson
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (there is “no due process violation in the
absence of prejudice”).  Accordingly, we deny the petition in part as it relates to the
BIA’s order dismissing Arboleda’s claim that her due process rights were violated.
III.
The degree to which the BIA rejected the IJ’s credibility finding is unclear
from the BIA’s statement that it refused to adopt the IJ’s suggestions that Arboleda’s
testimony was “necessarily fabricated.”  Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between
testimony that is unbelievable and testimony that is “necessarily fabricated,” but without
an explanation from the BIA, we are unsure that the BIA meant to draw such a
distinction.  Because the IJ rejected Arboleda’s requests for relief almost entirely based
on her adverse credibility determination, the basis of the BIA’s affirmance is uncertain. 
Therefore, we vacate the BIA’s order in part and remand for the BIA to clarify the basis
6for its decision with respect to the IJ’s rejection of Arboleda’s requests for relief.  See
Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2004) (remanding for clarification).  Of
course, we express no opinion on the merits of this portion of Arboleda’s appeal.
IV.
For the reasons given above, we grant the petition in part, vacate the BIA’s
order in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
